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Abstract  
In this paper, a general model of strategic behaviour of (regulated and non-regulated) firms in 
M&A is presented. However, the focus of the paper is on regulated firms (mostly 
monopolies). For these firms, the model shows that managers, acting on behalf of 
shareholders, make their strategic decisions on debt issuing and investment, in anticipation of 
both the decisions of the regulatory body and the responses of financial markets. These 
decisions are aimed at influencing the probability that an acquisition occurs as well as the 
price the potential bidder will have to pay. However, such decisions are also made with a 
view to influencing the regulatory policies (maximum price or rate of return permitted), 
thereby mitigating the probability that, in the regulatory game, the regulator adopts an 
opportunistic behaviour. Application of these results to some real-world situations (such as 
regulated public utilities’ companies) is straightforward (144 words).  
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1. Introduction  
 
Most managerial decisions impact on the firms’ preferred capital structure. By 
the same reasoning, one can think of M&A as also having an impact on the 
financial decisions of target firms. This is clearly the case when managers of firms 
targeted by a hostile attempt of takeover increase leverage with the only objective 
of deterring the impending threat. This type of commitment is similar to many 
others studied in Industrial Organization literature, specially the use of debt as a 
commitment device, which was examined in an oligopoly setting by Brander and 
Lewis (1986).  
Approaching M&A from the viewpoint of firms’ financial policies implies that 
we must recognize (and benefit from) the contribution of two strands of literature: 
Industrial Economics and Financial Theory. Proving how fruitful it may be, this 
approach is becoming popular among researchers (see for example, Showalter, 
1999; Dasgupta and Titman, 1998). 
Surprisingly, all research efforts in the field have ignored the case of firms 
subject to economic regulation, which raises specific issues. In fact, it is in this 
case that drawing on the contribution of Industrial Economics and Financial 
Theory is likely to be most insightful – most models in the Economics of 
Regulation are extensions of other models derived in the Industrial Organization 
literature, and the financial features of regulation are the less developed in that 
former field (even in the more rigorous and sophisticated works as, for example, 
Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Yet, those financial aspects are crucial in the 
“regulatory game”, where the financial strategies used by the managers of the 
regulated firm play a fundamental role not only in that game, but also in potential 
M&A (when allowed by the regulator and/or the government).     
 Capital structure plays an important role in rate regulation due to the 
interaction between the investment and financial decisions of a regulated firm and 
the pricing choices of regulators (Spiegel and Spulber, 1994). The regulatory 
process is a dynamic one, which can be modelled as a game in which the players 
are a firm, a regulator, and outside investors. Regulatory commissions set rates 
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that depend on the firm’s level of investment and capital structure, thus reflecting 
not only ratepayer interests, but also those of investors. The capital market, in turn, 
values the equity and debt of the regulated firm on the basis of its investment and 
capital structure, as well as on present and future regulatory policies (taking into 
account a “regulatory risk”). The regulated firm makes its investment and 
financial decisions in anticipation of regulatory policies and the capital market’s 
reactions. However, those financial decisions can also have a significant effect in 
the market for corporate control, if we admit that the regulator (and/or the 
government) permits M&A (or financial participations) in that kind of firms (in 
particular utilities). 
In fact, the decision about capital structure by the managers of the regulated 
firm affects the outcome of control contests through its effect on the distribution of 
cash flows between voting equity and nonvoting debt. In particular, higher debt 
levels result in a lower profitability for the acquirer and, therefore, in a lower 
probability of acquisition. Thus, the strategic choice of the optimal debt level is 
based on trading off a decrease in the probability of acquisition (marginal cost of 
debt) against an increase in the share of the expected synergy gain for the target’s 
shareholders (marginal benefit of debt), due to a better ability of a rival 
management to run the firm (if we admit that debt is issued in competitive markets 
at the present value of its expected payoff, yielding zero net present value to 
debtholders)1. Thus, those financial (strategic) decisions try to influence not only 
the price that a potential bidder must pay to obtain the control (as well as the 
probability of the acquisition), but also the regulatory policies about allowed 
prices or allowed rates of return (trying to mitigate an opportunistic behaviour of 
the regulator in the regulatory game)2. 
The contribution of this paper is to extend the basic model of strategic 
behavior in M&A to the case of firms subject to economic regulation and, can be 
useful to analyse some real-world situations, particularly in the case of regulated 
industries (usually public utilities), a growing sector in European countries. In 
                                                
1
 See, about this assumption, Israel (1991). 
2
 We can speak here about countervailing incentives. See, about this idea, Spiegel and Spulber (1997). 
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fact, rate regulation (or price caps)3 of public utilities in electricity, natural gas, 
telecommunications, cable TV, water services, and other industries is currently 
practiced by many regulatory commissions in most European countries, and 
accounts significantly for their GNP’s, as well as for their total business 
expenditures for new plants and equipments. At the same time, privatisation and 
restructuring of some of these industries (for example, electricity or natural gas) 
and liberalization of others (as the case of telecommunications) had shown that the 
size and number of transactions in the market for corporate control grew 
significantly (even with some restrictions posed by regulators and/or governments 
based in “national strategic concerns”…)4. 
The paper is organized as follows. A general model of strategic behavior in 
M&A is presented in section 2. In section 3 we analyse the application of the 
model to the case of regulated industries. The last section summarizes and 
concludes.  
 
2. A General Model of Strategic Behaviour in M&A  
  
  The model provides a basic framework in which regulated and non-regulated 
firms uses their capital structure as a strategic commitment in a control game. As a 
corollary of the model, we also analyse the reflections of those strategies in the 
product markets (in the case of regulated firms we analyse the implications of that 
commitment device in the regulatory game). 
Hence, we will use N or n for non-regulated industries and R or r when we are 
considering regulated firms. Consider an incumbent target-management (A) whose 
                                                
3
 Or even more “sophisticated” incentive regulatory schemes. For a rich and recent survey about 
incentive regulation, see Vogelsang (2002).  
4
 We must say that this type of operations (M&A and Financial Participations) takes place not only 
between European firms, but evolves third country’s firms (for example investments and acquisitions at 
Latin America). A particular interesting case, for our concerns, is the future “building” of an Iberian 
Electricity Market, which is now being discussed. For a summary of several types of M&A and 
Financial Participations, not only in the regulated sector but also for non-regulated firms, see Valente 
(2001; pp. 106-109).  
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objective is to maximize the market value of the firm (acting on behalf of 
shareholders). The managers choose capital structure anticipating the possibility 
that the firm will become an acquisition target of a rival management (B). We 
consider (in the control game) that the firm operates for one period in a risk-
neutral world in which the interest rate is zero. 
The firm produces a non-negative random cash flow, Y, whose probability 
distribution depends on the ability (x) of the management who controls. So, we 
will have a probability distribution given by H (Y/x), where x = n or x = r. On the 
other side, that ability (that we assume that can take values between 0 and 1, with 
higher values corresponding to better abilities), will be different depending on 
whether it is the incumbent management (na, ra) or the rival management (nb, rb) 
who is in control. 
At the beginning of the period, the incumbent management issues debt with 
face value F, collects its market value, denoted by D0 (F), and distributes it to the 
shareholders. The value of debt, conditional on the identity of the management 
who is in control, is denoted by D (F, x). The expected cash to equityholders under 
management x is denoted by: 
C (F, x) = Y (x) – D (F, x)    (2.1) 
It is important to note that (2.1), where Y (x) represents the cash flow under 
the control of x, it is not the market value of equity because it ignores the premium 
the acquirer (B) has to pay to get control.  
Considering its ability (nb, rb), the rival considers acquiring the target. We 
assume that the share price it must pay (m) to the target’s shareholders is a 
weighted average of the expected cash to equityholders under the incumbent 
management and the expected cash to equityholders (net of acquisition costs T) 
under the acquirer. Normalizing na, ra = 0, with the corresponding cash flow Y (0) 
known, with j = N, R and x = n, r, that price is given by: 
   m (Fj, xb) = γ j C(Fj, 0) + (1- γ j ) [ C(Fj, xb) – Tj] (2.2)  
Where γ  ( assuming values between 0 and 1) representing the bargaining 
power of the acquirer, will be different depending on whether it is a regulated or a 
non-regulated firm, that is to say, γ N ≠ γ R.  
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The control game begins if B has a nonnegative gain, that is to say, if, and only 
if: 
C(Fj, xb) – Tj ≥ C(Fj, 0)    (2.3)  
 In (2.3), which is obtained using (2.2), we assume that is left right (that 
represents the expected cash of the acquirer) increases with ability’s acquirer. 
Hence, we can define a minimal ability of the acquirer above which an acquisition 
becomes profitable: 
xb
min
 = xb
min
 (Fj)  ⇔   C(Fj, xbmin) – Tj ≡ C(Fj, 0)  (2.4) 
Assuming that the acquirer’s ability is uniformly distributed over [0, 1], we can 
define a probability of acquisition, as a function of debt level (F), which is given 
by:  
(Fj) = Pr (xb ≥ xbmin) = 1- xbmin                        (2.5) 
  The point that must be stressed, is that capital structure decisions, made by 
incumbent management, affect the price acquirer pays, m (Fj, xb), and the 
probability that acquisition will materialize, (Fj). Anticipating these 
consequences, the incumbent management, will choose a capital structure in order 
to maximize shareholders value at t = 0, that is to say, before the control game 
begins, trying to affect the game’s outcome (we must say that in the case of a 
regulated firm, j = R, that choice is influenced by the regulatory process, as we 
shall see).   
Firm’s value at t = 0 is given by: 
V0(Fj) =  E0(Fj) + D0(Fj)     (2.6) 
The ex-ante equity value is:  
E0(Fj) = [1- (Fj)] C(Fj, 0) + (Fj) [m (Fj, xb) | xb ≥ xbmin] (2.7)  
The first term on the right hand side of (2.7), is equity value under the 
incumbent management multiplied by the probability that it remains in control. 
The second term, is the conditional expected price (m) the acquirer pays times the 
probability that acquisition will take place. Similarly, the market value of debt, at t 
= 0, is: 
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D0(Fj) =[1- (Fj)] D(Fj, 0) + (Fj) [D (Fj, xb) | xb ≥ xbmin] (2.8)  
Where, similarly, we consider the conditional expected value of debt (D). 
If we admit that debt is issued in competitive markets at the present value of its 
expected payoff, yielding zero net present value to debtholders (“fair” price), then 
the debt level that maximizes ex ante firm value also maximizes ex ante equity 
value. Thus, the incumbent management acting on behalf of its shareholders5 , 
selects the optimal capital structure to maximize the ex ante total firm value, 
equity plus debt. Formally, selects the debt level Fj  that maximizes (2.6), which 
can be rewritten, using (2.1), (2.2), (2.5), (2.7) and (2.8), as: 
 [ ]  ∆+−∆γ−+= 1x
1
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j
b
j
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jjjj
0 min
b
min
b
dx)x,F(DdxT)x,F(C)1()0(Y)F(V          (2.9)  
Where ∆C(Fj, xb) = C(Fj, xb) – C(Fj, 0) and ∆D(Fj, xb) = D(Fj, xb) – D(Fj, 0). 
The firm value consists of the expected cash flow under the incumbent 
management, Yj(0), and a premium due to a possible value-increasing acquisition 
(that can be explained, for example, by a better ability - xb = nb or xb = rb ).  
Such a premium incorporates two components. The first component is the 
portion, (1-γ j) of the expected (net) appreciation in expected cash to equityholders 
accruing to the target’s shareholders. The second one is the total expected 
appreciation in debt value. The reason for this asymmetry is that while a portion γj 
of the expected appreciation in expected cash to equityholders accrues to the 
acquirer, the target captures the entire ex ante expected appreciation in debt value 
when debt is first sold at a “fair” price (as we have assumed).  
Meanwhile, the riskiness of debt and the fact that the acquirer has better ability 
than the incumbent management, imply that the expected appreciation in debt 
value increases with the level of Fj . This fact will imply, on the other hand, that 
the expected gain of the acquirer (with a better ability) will be smaller. Then, it 
results that the minimal ability of the acquirer above which an acquisition 
becomes profitable (xbmin) must be greater, the corresponding probability will be 
smaller as well as the probability of acquisition - (Fj). This is the value-
decreasing effect of debt on the premium in (2.9). 
                                                
5
 We ignore, for simplicity, any agency problems. 
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However, that negative effect must be traded off with a positive one. In fact, if 
we assume that the gross synergy, ∆Y = ∆D(Fj, xb) + ∆C(Fj, xb), is fixed, a change 
in the level of debt that results in a unitary increase in ∆D(Fj, xb) must also lead to 
a unitary decrease in ∆C(Fj, xb). Since the target’s shareholders realize the entire 
ex ante expected increase in debt value but lose only (1-γj) of the expected 
decrease in  ∆C(Fj, xb), their ex ante expected payoff increases with the level of 
debt (for a given probability of acquisition). So, we can speak of a value-
increasing effect of debt on the premium in (2.9). 
Hence, the incumbent management selects the optimal debt level trading off 
those two effects, and this optimal level, Fj *, satisfies the first order condition: 
0
F
V
*jj FFj
0
=
δ
δ
=
       (2.10)  
Which can be written in marginal terms:  
γ(1-xbmin) [δ∆D(Fj, xb) /δFj xb≥xbmin] = (δxbmin/δFj) [∆Y(xbmin)] (2.11)  
Where δ∆D is the expected value of the increment in the value debt. The left-
hand side of (2.11) is the marginal benefit of debt. It is the increment in the value 
transferred from the acquirer’s expected payoff to the debtholders.6 The value 
transferred consists of the acquirer’s bargaining power multiplied by the expected 
change in the appreciation in debt value. The debtholders, in turn, pay the target’s 
shareholders this full value when debt is first issued at a “fair” price. The right-
hand side of (2.11) is the marginal cost of debt. It consists of the probability that 
additional debt will deter the just indifferent acquirer (that is, the one with 
minimal ability) from acquiring the target firm multiplied by the foregone synergy 
as a result of this deterrence. Based on this tradeoff we can establish the existence 
of an optimal debt level. 
Meanwhile, an important insight is to analyze the consequences of such 
financial strategies in product markets. In fact, and for the case of non-regulated 
firms, the target firm usually interacts with rival firms (RV) in oligopolistic 
                                                
6
 Similarly, wealth of (1- γ) […] is being transferred from the shareholders to the bondholders of the 
target firm as the level of debt increases. The debtholders, however, pay this amount up front to the 
shareholders when debt is issued at a “fair” price.  
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markets. That greater level of debt (or a selection of FN*>0) can commit the firm 
to a more “aggressive” behavior (greater output - qAN) as a consequence of the so-
called limited liability effect (Brander and Lewis, 1986). On the other hand, an 
incumbent management who admits to increase leverage (in a defensive manner 
for the case, for example, of a leveraged buy-out or strategically as the case we are 
considering) wills anticipates the potential reaction of the rivals. 
In fact, firms contemplating leverage increases also consider the likely 
reactions of their competitors. A firm will be less willing to increase its leverage if 
it believes that rivals will respond to its new financial structure by aggressively 
cutting their prices (in a Bertrand game) to steal its market share.7 However, if 
competitors were expected to react to the leverage increase by increasing their 
prices (strategic complements), there would be an added impetus to increasing 
leverage.8  
In the case of regulated industries (j = R), where the firm that increases 
leverage is usually a monopoly, our task is to analyze the impact of such a kind of 
financial strategies in the regulatory game. In other words, the question is to 
identify a price influence effect of debt on regulatory decisions (Taggart, 1981). In 
fact, debt precommitment can raise rates by causing the regulator to avoid 
bankruptcy costs, that is to say, pR = pR(FR).  
 In this setting, we must define price functions (assuming a Bertrand game), 
where the level of debt influences that price. We will have: 
piN = piN(FiN)       (2.12)  
pR = pR(FR)      (2.13) 
Where i = A, RV. Hence, we will have as market value functions: 
[ ])F,F(p,FV)p,F(V NRVNANiN0NiN0 =    (2.14) 
V0(FR, pR) = V0[FR, pR(FR)]    (2.15) 
The above expressions, as well as the model presented, will permit us the 
analysis of several situations of financial strategies in M&A of regulated and non-
                                                
7
 For the reasons to use a Bertrand game see, for instance, Showalter (1995). Empirical evidence is 
provided by Chevalier (1995 a, b), Phillips (1995) and Showalter (1999). 
8
 In this paper we will not develop this case. See, for instance, Valente (2001). 
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regulated firms. The insight of the analysis is that we can also evaluate the impact 
of those strategies in product markets. In the case of non-regulated industries, 
usually in oligopoly markets where the firm who increases leverage interacts with 
rivals (RV) playing a Bertrand game. For the case of regulated sectors, mostly 
monopolies, we can analyze the influence of those strategies on regulatory 
decisions (in this case the regulator can be seen as the “rival”). In the next section 
we will discuss the case of regulated firms.  
 
3. Financial Strategies in M&A: The case of regulated firms 
3.1 The basic framework 
 
The case we will now discuss refers to the strategic positioning by an 
incumbent management, whose decisions are scrutinized by a regulatory 
commission. In such a case, the regulator set rates that depend on the firm’s level 
of investment and capital structure9, thus reflecting not only ratepayer interests, 
but also those of investors. In such a framework, the regulator will choose an 
optimal regulated price by maximizing a utilitarian welfare function given by: 
W (pR, I, D) = S (pR) + Ω piR (pR, I, D)  (3.1)  
Where pR  is the regulated price, I is the level of investment (eventually sunk) 
and D is the market value of debt (which will finance, at least partially, the level 
of investment). 
In (3.1), welfare depends on the price established by the regulator in two 
different and opposite ways. First, higher prices have a negative effect on welfare 
because consumers’ surplus (S) is less. On the other hand, with a higher regulated 
price the expected profit of the regulated firm (piR) will be higher and, 
consequently, this represents a positive effect on welfare. The expected profit also 
depends on I and D. In what concerns investment, it will have a positive effect on 
profits if we assume that it represents an “effort” in order to reduce production 
                                                
9
 We assume that regulated firms are allowed to exercise discretion in choosing their capital structure 
and investment level, at least, when the proposed projects are within the range of the utility’s corporate 
activity.  
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costs10. However, the regulatory authority usually treats the costs of investments 
as sunk costs, only considering its positive effect on profits. This represents an 
opportunistic behavior of the regulator (who, as we shall see, responds to the 
firm’s investment by cutting the regulated price), and the extent of regulatory 
opportunism depends on the regulator’s welfare weight (Ω). This one can take 
values between 0 and 1, which reflects an “environment” more or less pro-
consumer. In what concerns debt, its effect will be negative because of interest 
payments and increasing expected bankruptcy costs. 
From the maximization of (3.1) we will obtain an optimal allowed price, which 
will depend on the levels of investment and debt, or, pR = pR(I, D), which is 
equivalent to (2.13) in the general model, including now the level of investment 
and considering the market value of debt instead of its face value. Note that a 
regulated price, pR (I, D), corresponds to an allowed rate of return that can be 
obtained from the expected profit, taking into account that the firm’s capital stock 
(rate base – K) depends on the level of investment.  
 At this point, it is important to emphasize that we do not assume that the 
regulator is able to make credible commitments to specific rates of return, so rates 
cannot be established through prior announcements. In fact, regulators have 
considerable discretion in setting rates and in determining what is a “fair” rate of 
return. Formally, under rate regulation, the prices that the firm is allowed to 
charge are set such the firm’s expected revenues equal its estimated revenue 
requirement (cost-of-service). The latter is based on an estimate of the firm’s 
variable costs such as operating expenses, taxes, and depreciation, plus an allowed 
rate of return multiplied by the capital stock (rate base). The allowed rate of return 
is generally an average of the costs of debt and equity weighted by the relative 
proportions of debt and equity, usually measured at book value.11 The cost of debt 
is usually taken to equal total interest payments per unit of the book value of debt. 
                                                
10
 Of course this is just one possibility. See, about the parameterisation of “effort” in terms of cost 
functions, Laffont e Tirole (1993), Bös (1994) and Armstrong et al. (1994).   
11
 This procedure is followed not just under rate-of-return (or cost-of-service) regulation but also under 
price-cap regulation, because regulatory commissions set price caps on the basis of the firm’s cost of 
capital. About the cost of capital in regulated industries see, for example, Grout (1995) or Valente 
(2001, ch. 4). 
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The estimated cost of equity is perhaps the most troublesome and is arrived at in 
various ways, including the discounted cash flow method and the earnings/price 
ratio method, although in nowadays, and considering the state-of-the-art in 
Financial Theory, it is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) that is mostly 
used in regulatory proceedings12.  
In practice, because negotiations take place between the firm, consumers, and 
the regulator concerning each step in the calculation (rate hearings), regulators can 
exercise considerable discretion in the rate-setting process.13 In particular, 
regulators have some latitude in determining the underlying rate of return. A “fair” 
rate of return covers the cost of capital, but often exceeds the risk-free interest 
rate. It is important to emphasize that the regulator’s pricing policy affects the 
firm’s expected earnings, which in turn affect the firm’s cost of capital. Clearly, if 
the regulatory commission fails to take into account the effect of the rate setting 
on the firm’s value, the allowed rate of return may depart substantially from the 
actual cost of capital. The circularity of this process suggests that the regulated 
firm, the capital market, and the regulators all take into account the interrelated 
determination of the cost of capital and regulated prices. In such a setting, the 
regulator can be seen as “the rival”, because of his capacity to limit the choices 
that can be made by the regulated firm about prices to charge, outputs to be 
produced, or standards to be reached. 
Meanwhile, the insight of the analysis of the considering case, is that the 
strategic choice of debt by managers of a regulated firm can fit simultaneously two 
different intentions. Thus, on one hand, that choice can be the result of 
anticipating a takeover attempt by a rival management, trying to affect the price 
that the acquirer must pay, m (DR, rb), and the probability of acquisition, (DR), as 
it was established in the basic model. On the other hand, that strategic choice can 
                                                
12
 Alternative approaches based on comparable earnings require the regulator to identify firms with 
comparable risks, which is not an easy task in a lot of situations. About the problems on the estimation 
of the cost of capital of regulated firms, as well as the utilization of the CAPM, see Morin (1994), 
Kolbe et al. (1984) and Binder and Norton (1999).  
13
 For example, estimates of the cost of equity generally depend on regulatory assessment of investor 
expectations regarding the future performance of the firm and thus depend on future regulatory 
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result from the regulatory game, anticipating the regulator’s decisions about 
allowed prices or allowed rates of return.  
Hence, an incumbent management of a regulated firm will make its financial 
and investment choices (at t = 0) in order to maximize the expected profit of the 
firm, for all states of nature where the firm remains solvent (which makes clear 
that the incumbent management acts on behalf of shareholders, and reflects the 
limited liability effect). The expected profit is given by: 
( )[ ] ( )θθ θ−θpi=pi
1
r
m
r
r
R
0r
R
R
R
0
R
R dFD,I,p)D,I,p(   (3.2)  
Where rθ  represents a random variable distributed on the interval [θ0, θ1], 
according to the density function f (θr), which affects profit either through the 
demand function or the cost function. We also define a critical value, mrθ , below 
which firm is liquidated (we assume that profit increases with rθ ).14 So, the 
optimal choice of the regulated firm, (DR0*, I*), is made in order to maximize: 
V0 (DR0, pR) = V0 [DR0, pR(DR0, I) ]    (3.3)  
The above expression, which is identical to that one presented in the general 
model, (2.15), with the inclusion of variable I, shows that the management of a 
regulated firm, acting on behalf of its shareholders, will maximize (at t = 0) the 
market value of the firm given by (3.3). In order to do that, managers will make 
their strategic choices about the level of debt and the investments plan, 
anticipating a potential takeover attempt by a rival management, trying to take 
advantage of value-increasing acquisitions, and also anticipating the regulator’s 
plan about allowed prices. 
The regulator’s optimal pricing strategy is defined, once he observes the firm’s 
strategy, (DR0, I). We assume that the regulator place a high value on keeping the 
firm solvent. Accordingly, the optimal pricing strategy, pR *= pR *(DR0 *, I *), will 
be defined in order to maximize (3.1) subject to a restriction that the firm remains 
solvent. The probability of bankruptcy is given by: F(θrm). If we assume that 
                                                                                                                                       
policies. So, in regulatory environments we must take into account a regulatory risk (see, for example, 
Grout, 1995 or Kolbe et al., 1993). 
14
 See, for instance, Brander and Lewis (1988), although for the case of non-regulated firms. 
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expected bankruptcy costs are increasing with the firm’s insolvability degree, then 
those costs can be represented by: F [DR- piR(pR, I, θr)]. Then, the restriction in the 
regulator’s maximization programme will be given by: 
    piR(pR, I, θ0, r) ≥ F[DR- piR(pR, I, θ0, r)]   (3.4)  
Where we assume that the regulator sets a regulated price that is high enough 
to ensure that the firm is never liquidated for all debt levels, even in the “worse” 
state of nature, θ0, r. Meanwhile, the regulator’s incapacity to assume credible 
commitments about allowed prices or allowed rates of return, means that the 
probability of bankruptcy in equilibrium is positive (connected with regulatory 
risk), and the firm’s strategic issue of debt only attenuates the possibility of 
regulator’s opportunistic behaviour.  
 
3.2 The Regulatory Game and Regulator’s Opportunistic Behaviour   
 
The trade-off between expected bankruptcy costs and higher prices is the 
significant aspect of the regulator’s decision about allowed prices (and 
corresponding allowed rates of return). The regulator wishes to avoid bankruptcy 
costs, but faces deadweight losses from pricing above expected marginal costs. 
Hence, it can be established (Spiegel and Spulber, 1994) that the optimal regulated 
price always exceeds expected marginal cost, and for that price, given a positive 
level of debt, the probability of bankruptcy is positive (with the corresponding 
expected costs). 
On the other hand, if (3.4) is nonbinding, then the optimal regulated price is 
increasing in the regulator’s welfare weight on profits, Ω, that is to say, δpR */δΩ 
> 0. Meanwhile, the analysis could be generalized to allow uncertainty regarding 
the regulatory climate as reflected in the parameter Ω. This will introduce an 
additional source of randomness for the firm’s investors, and this is just what we 
mean by regulatory risk. Accordingly, the latter must be rewarded in financial 
markets. 
In certain conditions (see Spiegel and Spulber, 1994), the optimal regulated 
price also increases when the quality of the firm’s debt deteriorates. This shows, 
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once more, the regulator’s concerns about the firm’s financial integrity and could 
be parameterised in terms of the functions F(θr) and F[…], in order to reflect an 
increase in debt’s risk. 
However, the most important consideration, for our purposes, is the effect of 
regulated price on the probability of bankruptcy. A sufficient condition for a 
higher price to lower the probability of bankruptcy (for all I and DR) is: 
[ ]
)p(
1
p
I,),p(qCp
**
**
RR
m
r
RRR
q
R
η
<
θ−      (3.5)   
Where pR * = pR *(DR, I), CRq represents the expected marginal cost of the 
regulated firm and η(pR) is the elasticity of demand. The condition (3.5) implies 
that the optimal regulated price is less than the monopoly price for a firm with 
costs evaluated at θrm. This is equivalent to the statement that marginal revenues 
(Rp) at the critical level of the efficiency parameter (θr) are positive, which in turn 
implies that a price increase lowers the likelihood of bankruptcy, as δθrm/δpR = Rp 
(pR, I, θrm)/Cθr (qR, I, θrm) < 0, assuming that total costs are decreasing in the 
efficiency parameter (Cθ,r < 0). We can then conclude that if (3.5) holds for all I 
and DR, then: 
(i) The optimal regulated price is increasing in the firm’s debt obligation, 
or, δpR */δDR>0; 
(ii) The optimal regulated price is decreasing in the firm’s level of 
investment, or, δpR */δI<0.  
The conclusion is that the price-influence effect of debt is positive. This 
suggests that the regulated firm will issue debt to raise the regulated price, which 
can be seen as a limited liability effect. At the same time, the price-influence 
effect of investment is negative. This reflects regulatory opportunism and suggests 
that the regulated firm will reduce its investment level (perhaps investing less than 
the socially optimal level) in order to raise the regulated price. 
The occurrence of underinvestment can help us to understand why regulators 
permit firms to take on debt, despite the possibility of costly bankruptcy. By 
permitting debt, the regulator makes an implicit commitment to the regulated firm, 
thereby restricting future opportunism (in terms of allowed prices or rates of 
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return). That is, the regulator makes it more difficult for himself to lower the 
regulated price after the firm invests in, for example, cost reduction. This suggests 
that the regulator will permit firms to take on debt only if debt increases the firm’s 
(ex-ante) investment level such that the benefits from additional investment (for 
example, higher expected profits) are sufficiently high to outweigh the expected 
costs of bankruptcy. Debt can therefore serve as an imperfect substitute for 
regulatory commitment to rates.15  
 
4. Conclusion   
 
This paper presents a model of financial strategies in M&A of regulated and 
non-regulated firms. The main insight is that capital structure affects the outcome 
of control contests through its effect on the distribution of cash flows between 
voting equity and non-voting debt. In particular, higher debt levels result in a 
lower profitability for a potential acquirer and, therefore, in a lower probability of 
acquisition. Thus, the choice of the optimal debt level is based on trading off a 
decrease in the likelihood of acquisition against an increase in the share of the 
expected synergy gain for the target’s shareholders (due to the better ability of the 
rival management to run the firm).  
Moreover, we discuss the impact of those financial strategies in product 
markets, in particular for the case of regulated firms. In such situations, the crucial 
(but often neglected) aspect refers to the effect of that strategic use of debt in 
terms of the regulatory game. The adaptation of our general model to the 
regulatory process shows that capital structure can play a role in the strategic 
interaction between regulators and firms, with important implications in terms of 
regulatory policy. In equilibrium, the regulated firm issues a positive amount of 
debt as a consequence of regulation (and, in our general model foreseeing a 
                                                
15
 In equilibrium, however, the problem of underinvestment will subsist. Another reason why 
regulators may allow firms to use debt financing is suggested in Spiegel (1997). There, debt financing 
is shown to have a positive effect on a regulated firm’s choice of technology and, in addition, it 
eliminates the firm’s incentive to engage in goldplating. In this paper, however, as we have shown, the 
use of debt is justified in terms of potential m&a if allowed by the regulator and/or the government.  
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potential acquisition) despite the existence of bankruptcy costs. Debt serves to 
raise the regulated rates as the regulator seeks to reduce expected bankruptcy 
costs, although the probability of bankruptcy remains positive at the equilibrium.  
In the regulatory process, regulators set rates after the firm selects its 
investment and capital structure. The managers of the regulated firm, acting on 
behalf of shareholders, maximize (ex-ante) the market value of the firm, making 
their strategic choices about capital structure and the investments plan, 
anticipating regulator’s decisions and capital market’s responses.  
The regulated firm is shown to invest less than the socially optimum, which in 
turn raises regulated rates above the optimal level. However, the issuance of debt 
mitigates the regulator’s incentive to act in an opportunistic manner, and may 
therefore provide the firm with an incentive to increase its level of investment 
above that of an all-equity firm. This has important implications for regulatory 
policy. In particular, the strategic issuance of debt by the firm may create 
incentives for regulators to place limits on debt as a means of controlling the risk 
of bankruptcy. However, as has been shown in financial market models, the firm’s 
capital structure can provide information regarding its costs and performance 
(Spiegel and Spulber, 1997). This suggests the need for additional investigation of 
the informational aspects of capital structure in regulated industries.  
In the same vein, the model presented has important implications in what 
concerns regulators and/or policy makers’ decisions to authorize (or not) mergers 
and acquisitions of regulated firms, in particular public utilities.16   
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